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Chapter 1

THE STATE OF PRACTICE IN SUPPLYCHAIN MANAGEMENT:
A RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE
Leroy B. Schwarz
Krannert Graduate School of Management
Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana 47907
lschwarz@mgmt.purdue.edu

Abstract

In this paper, 1 will describe examples of state-of-the-art practice in
supply-chain management; e.g., vendor-managed inventory, quick response, and other contemporary systems, such as Wal-Mart's RetailLink.
The perspective will be that of what I call the JDJB Portfolio; i.e.,
what Information (I), Decision-Making {D), Implementation (I), and
Buffer (B) systems are employed in managing real-world supply chains.
Most operations-research models consider only two components of this
portfolio: the decision-making and the buffer systems. More specifically, most operations-research models involve selecting a decision-rule
to minimize expected buffer (e.g., inventory-holding and backorder) cost
given a fixed level of information. Implementation as a decision variable is typically ignored. However, in the real world, with changing
information, communication, and implementation technologies, supplychain management can - and should - be viewed as changing the nature
of the entire IDIB Portfolio. After interpreting current practice from
the perspective of the IDIB Portfolio, I will forecast future practice using Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) as
an example. I will describe the elements of CPFR, identify companies
that are using lt, and the challenges they face in realizlng lts potential. Finally, I will identify research opportunities in CPFR, and, more
generally, research opportunities involving the IDIB Portfolio.
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1.

Introduction

We've all seen one version of it or another: The consulting company's
Power-Point slide representing the evolution of supply-chain management (SCM). A staircase ascends left to right: on the bottom step is
"Basic Supply-Chain Management", typically intra-company MRP or
ERP systems; and on the top step, "Advanced Supply-Chain Management", typically described as ~'wireless, broad-band, web-based, truly
collaborative, etc.". The next slide asks: ~~where is your company?"
Sridhar Taynr (Carnegie Mellon University) displayed one of these
staircase slides at a recent meeting of supply-chain thought leaders at
Harvard University. Marshall Fisher (University of Pennsylvania) asked:
"Does anyone know of any companies that are at or near the top step T'
No one raised a hand. That slide, MarshalPs question, and no one's
answer provided the motivation for this paper.
In what follows I will do three things: First, I will describe the stateof-the-art in supply-chain management practice. A caveat: my assessment will be general; no details of specific buyer-supplier practice will be
described. Second, I will introduce a paradigm - called the "IDIB Portfolio1' - for understanding the evolution of supply-chain management to
date 1 and for predicting its future. Third 1 using this framework, I will
suggest topics for research.
My focus will be on managing the link(s) between buyers and suppliers
that are independently owned and managed. Although centrally-owned
and managed links provide a valuable benchmark 1 the real challenges
in supply-chain management involve two or more independently-owned
and managed companies. Two fundamental challenges are posed in improving the management of such supply chains: (1) the development of
techniques to improve overall supply-chain performance (e.g. 1 increasing
total supply-chain profit); and (2) the development of contracting mechanisms that will motivate all the partners to implement these techniques.
In other words: (1) how to "enlarge the pie"; and (2) how to "provide
larger slices" to all the partners. I will focus on the first challenge - the
development of techniques to improve overall performance. See Cachon,
2004 for a review of the supply-chain literature on the management of
incentive conflicts with contracts.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of
contemporary supply-chain management systems. In Sections 3-4 I will
introduce the !DIE-Portfolio paradigm, describe what "managing the
IDIB Portfolio" means, and contrast the IDIB-Portfolio paradigm with
the operations-research paradigm. Section 5 uses the IDIB-Portfolio to
provide a perspective on contemporary supply-chain management prac-

The state of practice in supply-chain management: a research perspective

3

tice. Section 6 describes two "Axioms of the IDIB Portfolio'' and, in
section 7, I use these axioms to forecast the future of supply-chain management. Section 8 provides an overview of Collaborative Planning,
Foreca.Stfllg, and Replenishment (CPFR), which, I believe, is one "contender'' for the future of supply-chain management. In Section 9, I identify several_ research topics in CPFR 1 in Section 110, several research
topics in supply-chain collaboration, and, in Section 11, several research
topics related to the IDIB Portfolio paradigm. Section 12 cites closelyrelated references. Section 13 provides a summary.

2.

An overview of contemporary supply-chain
management systems

Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI), introduced by Kurt Solomon Associates in 1992 (http: I lwww. kurt salmon. com) is perhaps the most
widely-known system for managing supply chains. Under VMI, the
buyer authorizes the supplier (i.e., vendor) to manage the inventory of
a set of stock-keeping units (SKUs) at the buyer's site(s) under agreedupon parameters (e.g., minimum and maximum inventory targets). The
buyer provides the supplier with sales and/or inventory-status information; and the supplier makes and implements decisions about replenishment quantities and timings.
VMI reduces information distortion, which is one cause of the "bullwhip" effect {Lee et al., 1997). In addition, VMI provides the supplier
with the opportunity to better manage its own production, inventory,
and transportation costs. (See, for example, Qetinkaya and Lee, 2000).
In- exchange, the buyer typically receives price discounts or improved
terms of payment from the supplier.
Quick Response (QR), was innovated by Milliken & Company (http:
I l;r;rw .milliken. com) in the early 1990's and subsequently codified by
the Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Standards (VICS) Association.
QR has four levels of application and technology. Levels 1 and 2, for
example, involve retailer inventory-status information-sharing and automatic order-processing between retailer and supplier. Levels 3 and 4
include VMI and cross-docking warehouses. See Fiorito et al., 1994 for
more information.
Although VMI and QR might be the "best-known" management systems among both practitioners and academics 1 perhaps the most highlyregarded systems are proprietary systems developed by large retailers)
such as Wal-Mart's RetailLink, Kmart's Workbench, and Target's Partners Online. Although the detailed inner workings of these systems are
closely-guarded secrets, they all have two common characteristics: (1)
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the sharing of transactions-level data between among partners; and (2)
the use of agreed-upon metrics (c.g. 1 in-stock, inventory-turnover and,
on-time delivery measures) and targets to assess partner performance.
RetailLink, for example, captures sales,· inventory, and delivery-related
data for every SKU at every Wal-Mart facility (i.e., store and distribution center) and uploads it to a central database at least every 24
hours. These data, and metrics based upon them, are made available to
every manager and every company up or down the supply chain whose
performance is related to this SKU.
How this shared information is used - in particular, whether the decisions based on it are made centrally or decentrally - depends on the
specific partnership agreement, and the type of product(s) being managed. Similarly, who does the implementation and how it is done is
specific to the partnership and product(s ). To illustrate: Wal-Mart generally centralizes decision-making but decentralizes implementation for
Wal-Mart and Sam's Club facilities, while delegating decision-making
and implementation to its suppliers. However 1 regardless of who makes
or implements the decisions, the quality of the decisions and their im-.
plementation are continually monitored by all parties and compared to
the agreed-upon targets.
Before taking a closer look at current supply-chain practice 1 I will
introduce a simple paradigm that will be useful in interpreting it.

3.

Information, Decision, Implementatio n, and
Buffer (IDIB) systems

Managing anything, including managing a supply chain, can be viewed
as four related activities: (1) getting information for decision-making;
(2) decision-making; (3) implementing decisions; and (4) buffering against imperfections in (1)-(3). Correspondingly, every organization has
systems for performing these four activities.

The Information system
The role of the "information system:' is to provide past, present, and
future-oriented information for decision making. This information might
be about demand, costs, materials, capacities 1 etc. An ideal Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) system should be capable of capturing and
providing all this information. In practice, however, information "in the
information system" is captured and stored in dozens of different ways 1
among them paper records and computer tapes. In many organizationS 1
much of this information is: literally, in·the heads of management personnel.
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· Hence) a firm :s infonp.ation system is the less "~ thing" and more
a collection of "things": the collection of all business processes - formal and informal - plus all the information technologies and systems
that provide infonllation for decision-making. In this sense, information
systems are "decision-support systems". However, I prefer the label "information system'' since most decision-support systems are limited in
their domain, and,· hence, are a subset of the information system.
The overall quality of an information system's information about anything can be measured as spme combination of: (1) its accuracy, that is,
the correspondence between past, present, and future reality and what
the information system reports (or reported) about it; (2) its leadtime;
i.e., the time between an event and when the information system reports
it; (3) its level of aggregation; i.e., the categories and units in which information is provided; and (4) its horizon; i.e., how far into the future
(or past) the information system looks.
At their worst, information systems provide grossly inaccurate, even
irrelevant, information. ''Better" information systems typically provide
some historical information and some current-status information. Still
better information systems provide future-oriented information, such as
demand forecasts and cost projections. A "perfect" information system
would be the proverbial crystal ball, capable of seeing perfectly into the
past, present, or future.
Another important characteristic of a company's information system
is its cost; that is, the cost of the people, equipment, facilities, and
processes that, together, comprise the information system. Typically, for
a given technology, the cost of an information system is an increasing,
and marginally-increasing function of its overall quality. In other words,
improving a given information system costs more, and each additional
increment in quality costs more than the last.
From a management perspective, of course, the value of an information system doesn't depend on the quality of the information it provides,
but on the quality of the decisions made based on this information.
The Decision-Making system
The role of a decision-making system 1 of course, is to make decisions
using the information provided by the information system. Decisionmaking takes many different forms and is performed by many different
individuals or groups. Decision-making occurs throughout every organization, from the shop-floor to the executive suite. Strategic decisions
(e.g., the organization of the supply-chain, product offerings) are typically made at the executive level. Managerial decisions (e.g., the master schedule, order-promising) are typically made by middle managers.
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Tactical decisions (e.g. 1 processor assignment, workload sequencing) are
typically delegated to the shop floor. The decision-making processes
themselves might be informal, even intuitive (e.g., "Ned uses his 25 years
of experience to assign workloads to processors), or they might be codified, even regulated. For example, in US pharmaceutical manufacturing,
most of the production decisions {e.g., the process steps and lot sizes)
have been specified and FDA approved and, hence, must be adhered
to. The corresponding decision rules might be simple - for example, in
master-scheduling ''run-out rules" are often used- or mathematically sophisticated (e.g., master-schedule optimization using mathematical programming). The decision-rules might be formal and automated; or, they
might be totally within the head of some individual or group of individuals. Typically, important decisions are the result of a complex set of
activities; some logical or based on management judgment, some simply
guess-work.
The overall quality of a decision-making system's decisions can be
measured as some combination of: {!) the optimality of the decisions
made; and {2) the decision-making leadtime. "Optimality" means how
desirable the decision is - given the quality of information provided by
the information system - with respect to cost, profit, or some other
measure of utility. The "decision-making leadtime" is the amount of
time it takes to make the decision once the appropriate information has
been provided. This lead time might be short or long; it might he a fixed
amount of time, or variable; it might be known or unknown in advance.
Like information systems, the cost-drivers for decision-making systems
are the people, equipment, facilities, and processes that, together, comprise it. And, like information systems, for a given technology, the cost
of a decision-making system is typically an increasing, and marginallyincreasing function of its overall quality. In other words, improving a
given decision-making system costs more, and each additional increment
in quality- for example, each increment in the desirability of its decisions
or each decrease in leadtime - costs more than the last.
Finally, like information systems, the value of a decision-making system doesn't depend only on its quality characteristics. In particular, a
"perfecf' decision that doesn't get implemented is of no value.

The Implementation system
Implementation usually involves some "paperwork'' to authorize or initiate activity. For example, a decision to ship 200 units from Dock 4 at
12 o'clock on April 5th, will typically involve inventory-withdrawal authorizations, transportation requisitions, etc. Often, some preliminary
actions must also be taken. For example, if 200 units aren't in inven-

The state of practice in supply-chain management: a research perspective

7

tory: then production decisions and their corresponding implementations
must take place.
The overall quality of an implementation system can be measured as
some combination of: (1) the implementation leadtime; and (2) implementation accuracy. The "implementation leadtime 1' is the amount of
time required to make the decision happen; in other words, the time
between making the decision and having the corresponding actions completed (i.e., implemented). For example, the amount of time it actually
takes to ship the 200 units from Dock 4 once the decision has been
made to do it. Like decision-making leadtimes, implementation leadtimes might be short or long, fixed or variable, known or unknown in
advance. "Implementation accuracy" measures how closely the implementation matches the decision. Perfect accuracy means that the implementation perfectly matched the decision; for example, that exactly
200 units were shipped from Dock 4 at 12 o'clock on April 5th In practice, implementation is seldom perfect: differences may be small, as in a
tightly-controlled JIT system, or large, as in high-density chip fabrication1 where yield losses are unpredictable and difficult to control.
Often trade-offs occur between the implementation lead time and the
accuracy-of-implementation. The phrase "quick-and-dirty'', for example, means that decision-making and implementation are "quick" (i.e.,
that their combined leadtime is short) but that the decision and/or its
implementation are "dirty" (i.e., that the decision isn't very desirable
and/or the implementation isn't accurate) 1
Like information and decision-making systems: implementation systems cost money; that is, the cost of the people, equipment, facilities,
and processes that involve making the decision happen. And, like information and decision-making systems, for a given level of technology,
the cost of an implementation system is typically an increasing, and
marginally-increasing function of its overall quality. In other words, improving a given implementation system - that is, making it faster or
more accurate - costs more, and each additional increment in quality
costs more than the last.

The Buffer system
In a perfect world, information systems would provide perfect information and decision-making systems would make perfect decisions. Implementation would be perfect, too. However, in the real world, none of

1 1n fact, decision-making and implementation are often iterative.
For example, a decision
might be made; then, during the process of implementation, new information is revealed that
might lead to modifying the decision, etc.
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these three systems is ever perfect. Management systems compensate
for these imperfections using buffers and buffer systems.
\Vhat are buffers? Unlike information, decision-making, and implementation systems, which can re realized in a virtual infinity of different
forms: buffers come in only three basic forms: inventory: leadtime 1 and
capacity. A "'buffer system" is a combination of inventory, leadtime:
and capacity buffers, in various amounts, located within what might
be called the "management-system supply chain". Often, for example,
inflated leadtimes or extra capacity are imbedded in the information,
decision-making, and implementation systems. Work-in-process inventories are typically found throughout the implementation system: with
raw-material inventories at the beginning and finished goods at the end
of the implementation chain. Leadtime buffers (e.g., inflated promise
dates) are typically found at the interface between the points of delivery
and the customers.

Re-thinking buffers
The best way to understand - indeed, appreciate -the roles that buffers
play in a management system is this: forget everything you've thought
about them until now. In particular, put aside any notion that buffers
are inherently "bad:'.
Yes 1 buffers are often thought to be "bad'1 • Why? Perhaps ies bec~use
buffers cost money. Yet: the other three components of a management
system cost money, too. It is also worth noting- and peculiar, I thinkthat despite the fact that information, decision-making, and implementation systems also cost money, these three elements of a management
system axe generally thought to be "good". Further, it is generally
accepted that ~~improving' - that is, increasing the capabilities - of
an information, decision-making, or implementation system is a "good
thing". On the other hand, it is generally thought that "improving a
buffer" must mean reducing its _capabilities or elimiriating it. Put this
notion aside, too.
Another rea.son why buffer systems might be thought to be "bad" is
that whatever amount of buffering management chooses to provide, it is
typically the wrong amount. In other words, the amount of buffering is
either too much - for example, leftover inventory at the end of a selling
season - or not enough - for example, that sales were lost despite the
fact that ~~lots" of safety stock was provided.
I believe it is more useful - and accurate - to think about buffers in
terms of the role they play in an management system: to compensate for
imperfections in the information, decision-making, and implementation
systems. From this perspective, I believe that buffers can only rightfully
1
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be called "too big" if they overly, or unnecessarily, fail to do what they
are intended to do: to compensate for imperfections elsewhere in the
management system. Similarly, buffers should only be thought of a.s
"bad" if they imperfectly compensate for those imperfections.
What would a "perfect" amount of buffering be?
Consider a business scenario like that of the newsvendor model, and a
management system whose information system, I, perfectly forecast customer demand. Assume that this perfect forecast is provided to decisionmaking, D, and implementation, I, systems that are capable of providing
exactly this number of units at the instant they are demanded in precisely the right quantity. How much buffering, B, is required to perfectly
satisfy customer demand? None. In other words, the "perfect" amount
of buffering in this system is zero.
Now change the management system slightly so that the information
system can only provide a probability distribution of future demand.
Given this level of imperfection in the information system, is any management system capable of always satisfying customer demand without
lost sales or unused inventory, capacity, or leadtime?
The answer is 'tyes", provided that the decision-making and implementation systems are perfect; that is, provided that, once demand is
known, management is capable of deciding to provide this amount, and
provided that ·the implementation system is capable of producing precisely this amount instantaneously. Here, too, the perfect amount of
buffering would be zero. On the other hand, unless the decision-making
and implementation systems are perfect, some buffering will be required.
How much and what kind of buffering?
Suppose that the "IDL systems" - that is, the combined information, decision-making, and implementation systems - are perfect with
respect to leadtime, but imperfect with respect to quantity. In other
words, some amount will be provided at exactly the right time to satisfy demand, but that the quantity won't necessarily equal the quantity
demanded. In order to avoid lost sales, inventory buffering will be required, the amount depending on the overall imperfection, or variance,
in the quantity the IDL provides. As the variance of this imperfection
increases, in order to compensate the corresponding amount of buffer
inventory must also increase. In the extreme, as this variance increases
to infinity, the "perfect" amount of buffering also increases to infinity.
Next, suppose that IDL systems above are imperfect in quantity and
leadtime. In order to satisfy demand at the time that it occurs in the
quantity demanded, a leadtime buffer must be added tc the inventory
buffer. And, as the uncertainty in "supply leadtime" increases, the corresponding leadtime buffer must also increase.
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Finally, since in many situations, the uncertainty arising from the IDL
systems is a consequence of scheduling conflicts on some constrained resource(s), capacity buffers can usually be substituted for some of the
inventory and lead time buffers. Hence, the appropriate forms of buffering ~ inventory, leadtime, or capacity - depends on the nature of the
imperfection(s) in the IDL systems.
Finally, then, given some form of buffering, what is the "perfece'
amount?

The "perfect" amount of buffering?
If the role of the management system - the !DIE - is to provide what
is required or demanded at the time and in the quantity that's required
or demanded; and if the role of a buffer is to compensate for imperfections in the IDL systems, then the "perfecf' amount of leadtime,
capacity, or inventory is the amount that does just that and no more:
the amo~nt that provides precisely what's required or demanded despite
the imperfections in the IDL systems. Hence, the "perfecf' amount of
buffering is never zero unless the IDL systems are capable of perfection.
Furthermore, as the combined imperfections in the IDL increases, the
corresponding perfect amount of buffering must also increase.
An aside on the "Zero Inventory" concept often associated with Ju~t-in
Time systems: The concept of zero inventory, or, more generally, zero
buffering can be an extremely important in identifying the nature and
magnitude of imperfections in an IDL system. In other words, reduce
the amount of buffering and "see" what imperfections are revealed. Often such experiments uncover imperfections in the IDL systems that are
inexpensive to reduce or eliminate. If so, then this should be done and
the corresponding amount of buffering should be permanently reduced.
However, to the extent that imperfections in the IDL systems remain,
the perfect amount of buffering isn't zero.

Hence, the perfect amount of buffering depends on the imperfection
in the combined IDL systems. If the amount of imperfection - that is,
the uncertainties associated with the IDL systems - increases, then the
overall level of buffering also must be "improved" - increased - in order
to compensate.

The cost of buffering
Like all the other components of a management systems, the cost of
an buffer system is typically an increasing, and marginally-increasing
function of its overall quality. In other words, improving - that is, increasing - the capability of any given buffer costs more, and, typically,
each additional increment in quality costs more than the last.
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An alterrtative perspective: the "optimal" amount of buffering
The operations research (OR) paradigm provides an alternative perspective on buffers~ and, based on this perspective, defines the "optimar'
amount of buffering. The perspective of the OR paradigm is as follows:
The realized amount of buffering provided by a given management system is the difference between what reality requires or demands and what
the management system provides. For example, if demand was 100 units
and the management system provided 120 units, then the buffer was 20
units. Or, if management provided capacity of 40 hours and capacity of
50 hours was required, then the buffer was -10 units. A negative buffer,
whether its inventory, capacity, or leadtime, means that the management system didn't provide enough of what was required or demanded;
a positive buffer means that- too much was provided.
Correspondingly, the OR paradigm takes the view that the cost of the
buffer system is the cost of all the positive buffering, plus all the costs
associated with negative buffering. In other words, the cost of the buffer
system is the cost of all the unused inventory, capacity, and leadtime
that the management system provided - measured after demand for
that resource occurs - plus the cost of all the corresponding shortages of
inventory, capacity, and leadtime. (e.g., lost sales, backorder, goodwill
cost).
The newsvendor model is, perhaps, the best-known example of the
OR paradigm. The newsvendor model chooses the optimal "target inventory" based on three "drivers": the per-unit cost of "not enough"
buffering (i.e., opportunity cost of lost sales), the per-unit cost of "toomuch buffering" (i.e., the out-of-pocket leftover cost), and the probability distribution of demand. The expected-cost minimizing target inventory is provided by the well-known "newsvendor fractile'' of the cumulative demand distribution. The corresponding "safety-stock" (inventory)
buffer is measured, a priori, as the difference between the chosen target
inventory and the expected customer demand.
What's wrong with the OR paradigm's view of buffers?
There is nOthing "wrong" with the OR paradigm or with its view of
buffers. "Near-sighted" would be a better description.
In particular, the OR-paradigm's view of the too-much and not-enough
costs associated with the imperfections of a management system is consistent with the IDIB-paradigm perspective. In other words, once, say,
demand occurs, the relevant costs incurred because of an imperfect IDIB
are those associated with providing too much or not enough of whatever
was demanded.
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But why should these too-much and not-enough costs only be associated with- if you will: "blamed:' on- the buffer system? Yes, buffers
are typically imperfect, but what about the imperfections in the IDL
systems? More -on this below.
One way of looking at the difference between the OR and the !DIE
paradigms is that the IDIB paradigm generalizes the OR paradigm.
Specifically, the IDIB paradigm takes the view that the quality of all
four components of a management system - not just the buffer system
quality (i.e., size) - are decision variables; second, that the underlying
quality-cost function for each of these components - that is, the cost to
move them in the direction of perfection - is increasing and marginally
increasing. Finally: that there is a cost associated with the entire IDIB
portfolio- again, not just the buffer system- for failing to provide whatever is required or demanded. Hence, the "optimal" IDIB is the IDIB
that minimizes the total costs of all of its components plus the cost of
failing to provide whatever is required or demanded.
From this point of view, the OR paradigm is "ncar-sighted" to the
extent that it takes the IDL as fixed, and focuses only on picking the
amount of buffering that minimizes the corresponding too-much and
not-enough buffer cost.
We will address the question of the optimal IDIB in Section 11. We
turn now to the concept of the "!DIE Portfolio".

4.

The IDIB portfolio

I label the combination of these four components of a management
system - the information, decision-making, implementation, and buffer
systems - a "portfolio", because, like a financial portfolio, each of these
systems involves an investment of dollars. And, like the performance
of an investment portfolio, the performance of a management system
depends on how well its components perform in combination, not as
separate components. Finally, in assembling an IDIB Portfolio, as in
assembling a financial portfolio, an almost unlimited number of combinations can be chosen. As an illustration, suppose the goal is to manage
a supply chain to provide a 95% customer fill-rate at the retail level.
This might be provided by managing every link of the chain with lowquality information, decision-making, and implementation systems, but
large inventory buffers everywhere. Or, without changing the management of the other links in this supply chain, the manufacturer might
substitute buffer capacity for some of its finished-goods inventory and
still offer the same service to the distributor. Similarly, the distributor
might choose higher cost of express delivery (from the manufacturer) in
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order to reduce the expediting and inventory-holding cost on its safetystock (buffer) inventory. Three different IDIB Portfolios all providing
the same level of customer serviCe.
Which is best?
If the goal of a management system is to maximize profit: then the
"best" IDIB Portfolio is the portfolio with the least total cost: that is,
the total cost of all the people, facilities, equipment, and technology
associated with providing information, making decisions, implementing
them, and buffering to compensate for imperfections in the IDL systems,
plus the cost of lost sales, expediting, and goodwill loss resulting from
failing to do all this perfectly.

Managing the IDIB portfolio
"Managint' the IDIB Portfolio means making decisions about the nature
and quality of its four components: the information, decision-making,
implementation, and buffer systems. The ideal is to select the quality
of each component, plus the cost of lost sales, etc., so that total cost
is minimized. Is "managing the IDIB Portfolid' amenable to the tools
of operations research? I think it could be, but most OR models are
defined much too near-sightedly to be called "IDIB optimizers", much
less, "IDIB improvers".
Consider the well-known newsvendor inventory model. In this model,
the information system provides the probability distribution of customer
demand and estimates of the costs associated with buying and selling
newspapers. Attention is focused on the decision about the number of
newspapers to have on hand at the beginning of the day in order to maximize the newsvendor's expected profit. The optimal decision-rule is well
known: set this inventory equal to the ''c~itical fractile of the probability distribution of customer demand. The newsvendor's implementation
leadtime is not explicitly considered. Instead, it is usually assumed that
whatever this leadtime is: it is short enough so that, once the newsvendor has decided how much to order, the chosen quantity will be delivered
on time. The basic newsvendor model also ignores implementation accuracy; that is, it is implicitly assumed that whatever quantity is ordered
will be delivered. Extensions of the newsvendor model consider accuracy; that is: .the correspondence between what is ordered and what is
delivered (See Karlin, 1958 and Ehrhardt and Taube, 1987, for example;
see Yano and Lee, 1995 for other references).
I believe the newsvendor model is representative of virtually every
operations-research model of supply-chain management. That is, the
quality of the information provided by the information system is assumed to be fixed. The costs associated with the information, decision1
'
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making are typically ignored. The costs associated with implementation
are sometimes represented: but in a highly-stylized manner. For example, the only implementation cost associated with the newsvendor
model is the marginal purchasing cost. Similarly, the only implementation cost associated with the .EOQ model is the assumed-to-be-fixed
order cost. The goal, as described above, is to determine the decisionrule that minimizes buffer-system cost. In !DIE Portfolio terms, the
newsvendor model-like most supply-chain models- selects the decisionrule for the decision-making system ("D'') that minimizes expected total
buffer-system ( ''B 11 ) cost for a fixed quality of information, "F. The implementation "P is represented either as a cost or as a constraint; not
as a decision-variable.
"Managing the newsvendor's IDlE Portfolio" is much more complex.
It does involve selecting decision rules, but the objective is to ffiinimize
total portfolio cost, not just the cost of the buffer system. In particular,
managing the newsvendor's IDIB also involves assessing the cost and
value of an information system that would provide more (or, possibly,
even less!) precise information about customer demand. It also involves
assessing the cost and value of implementation systems with different
leadtimes and accuracies. J\1ore broadly, managing the newsvendor's
IDIB portfolio ·might involve fundamental changes in the newsvendor's
operations.
Suppose, for example, that the newsvendor· was able to make and
implement her /his ordering decisions any number of times during the
day and receive those newspapers instantaneously (i.e., decision and implementation leadtimes of zero). In such a scenario, the newsvendor
wouldn't inventory any newspapers, nor would he/she need a probability distribution of demand. Instead, the newsvendor would wait until
a customer requested a newspaper and then provide it upon demand.
Sound far fetched? Consider this:
For decades, the copier division of Xerox struggled with managing
the inventory of owner's manuals for its copiers: how much inventory of
which manuals to have on hand, and when to replenish this inventory.
Xerox eliminated this problem by developing a system for printing and
binding manuals upon demand; i.e., whenever assembly of a copier is
scheduled, the printing of its manuals is also scheduled.
How was this done? By developing a system for implementing the
decision to produce manuals whose leadtime is less than or equal to the
time required to implement the decision to assemble the copier.
"Managing" the !DIE Portfolio is no easy task. First, the different
components of the portfolio are often difficult to identify. For example,
managers, who are nominally decision-makers, also often play a role in
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the information system; line personnel~ who are nominally implementers~
have roles to play in information, decision-making, and buffering. So, it
is often difficult to separate the components of a firm's IDIB portfolio.
Second, many of the costs associated with a firm's IDIB portfolio are
"overhead'' or "indirect" costs, which makes them difficult to estimate.
These and other difficulties make it virtually impossible to find the truly
optimal IDIB portfolio; that is, the portfolio of information, decisionmaking, implementation, and buffering whose combined cost plus the
cost of failing to provide enough of whatever was demanded or required
(e.g., backordering or expediting cost) is the minimum possible cost.
Nonetheless, it is often relatively easy to verify that one given IDIB
portfolio has lower total cost than another. In the Xerox example above,
it was relatively easy to verify, using back-of-the-envelope estimates, that
Xerox's "new" portfolio was an order of magnitude less expensive than
its old one.
Xerox's old information sys.tem ignored the fact that Xerox management decided which copiers to produce and when to produce them. Instead, it assumed that demand for a given manual was provided by a
probability distribution. Xerox's new IDIB portfolio uses information
that management has scheduled a given copier to be assembled, and
then implements the decision to print its manuals in a short enough
leadtime so that the manual can be packaged with the copier at the end
of the assembly line.
I believe that experienced operations researchers, practitioners, and
consultants already recognize the tradeoffs that the IDIB Portfolio makes
explicit. For example, consultants will often prescribe a less-than-perfect,
heuristic decision-rule because it is less demanding of the information
system and/ or easier to implement, particularly if these imperfections
are relatively inexpensive to buffer against. On a broader level, sensitivity analysis, which is a well-founded tool of the operations research
theorist, can be viewed assessing ·the impact of imperfections in the quality of the information and/or decision-making systems on system performance, and, hence, the level of buffering that might be required. For
example, sensitivity analyses on the basic EOQ model can be viewed
as assessing the sensitivity of lot-sizing decisions to inaccuracies (i.e.,
imperfections) in the information required to support it (e.g., estimates
of company inventory-holding cost or set-ups). See Lowe and Schwarz,
1983, for example.
Similarly, but at a metaphysical level, operations-research theorists
often prefer a less realistic (i.e.: less perfect) model to a more realistic,
more perfect, model because of the insight its analysis provides.
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From this point of view, the fundamental difference between the IDIB
paradigm and the OR paradigm is that experienced operations researchers,
practitioners, and consultants make these tradeoff a priori; that is 1 without explicitly identifying all the alternative levels of quality in information: decision-making, and implementation systems that might be chosen. Although this is understandable, such a priori choices necessarily
lead to locally, not globally optimal cboices for the corresponding IDIB
portfolio.

The role of information technology and economics
What "happened" at Xerox that led to its development of a new IDIB
portfolio for managing manuals? Was it management 1s "discoveri' that
their own decisions created the demand for manuals? Not likely.
Obviously, the availability of technology played a role: printing-andbinding technology that could "quickly" produce an owner's manuaL In
IDIB Portfolio terms, technology whose implementation leadtime was
shorter than the implementation leadtime to assemble a copier. The
other element 1 of course, is economics: Given that technology can facilitate a "new" IDIB portfolio, its adoption only makes sense if the total
cost of the "new" portfolio is less than the total cost of the "old" portfolio. So, obviously, technology and economics play a substantial role in
the development of "new" IDIB portfolios.
Given the proven success of information technology (e.g., micro- computers and the internet) as a significant facilitator of improved information, decision-making, and implementation, I believe it is inevitable
that information technology will continue to create the opportunities
for "new" IDIB portfolios. Further, to the extent that the cost of information technology continues to fall, following Moore's Law2 , these
IDLsystems will continue to become less and less expensive. And,
buffers, ~'B" s - inventory: capacity, and leadtime - are, if anything, becoming more expensive over time.
Hence, I believe information technology and economics will continue
to offer IDIB portfolios to supply-chain managers whose total cost is

2The observation made in 1965 by Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, that the number of
transistors per square inch on integrated circuits had doubled every year since the integrated
circuit was invented. Moore predicted that this trend would continue for the foreseeable
future. In subsequent years, the pace slowed down a bit, but data density has doubled
approximately every 18 months, and this is the current definition of Moore's Law, which
Moore himself has blessed. Most experts, including Moore himself, expect Moore's Law to
hold for at least another two decades. Source: vebopedia.com (definition last modified in
March, 1998).
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less than today's"- The challenge to supply-chain managers is: Which
new IDIB portfolio to adopt, and when to adopt it? The challenge to
supply-chain modelers is: Wh<it techniques and models will aid managers
in choosing new IDIB portfolios?

5.

An IDIB portfolio perspective on
supply-chain management

Until fairly recently, virtually every link of every real-world supply
chain was managed using a very crude IDIB portfolio. Typically, the
only information a buyer shared with its supplier was its current order;
and the most information the supplier shared with the buyer was this order's planned or promised shipping date. Status information (e.g., order
status, inventory -status) and future-oriented information (e.g., planned
orders and production) were seldom, if ever, shared, often because neither partner had easy access to its own information about them. Further,
in those instances when one partner did have access to this information,
the technology for sharing it either wasn't available or was very expensive. As a consequence, supply-chain ('partners'' - if we can call them
that - were figuratively blind to one another. In the absence of useful supplier/customer information for decision-making, each "partner''
made decisions that were focused on what little information was available, typically, internally-focused information, such as processor utilization, hot lists, etc. Consequently, the decision-making and implementation: based on this low-quality information required huge buffers: large
buffer inventories {raw materials, wo.rk-in-process, and finished goods)
plus buffer leadtimes and capacity.
Given the high cost of these buffers, it's no surprise that when lowcost technology for information-sharing between buyers and suppliers
became available, innovators seized the opportunity to substitute lowcost information-sharing for these high-cost buffers, thereby achieving
significant improvements in performance and/or reduced total cost.
Wal-Mart, of course, must be credited with introducing many of the
technological innovations {e.g., bar-coding, satellite communication of
point-of-sale information) associated with contemporary supply-chain
3Although new technological capabilities are likely to be the primary drivers for changing an
existing 1D1B Portfolio, at least in the short term, it is important to note that even if technology were held constant, any significant change in the cost of one or more of the components of
any given IDIB Portfolio is an equally-important driver. For example, holding everything else
equal, a significant decrease in the cost of capital makes inventory and equipment buffering
less expensive. Under these circumstances, increasing the quality of the buffer system and
decreasing the quality of the corresponding information, decision-making or implementation
system should reduce total cost.
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management, and equally important, in demonstrating that substituting
improved information for inventory and leadtime buffers reduced total
cost.
And, so the "revolution'' in supply-chain management began and continues today, the state-of-the-art represented by Wal-Mart's RetailLink
system.
Yet, what is really different about these systems? From an IDlE
perspective, these innovations are actually fairly modest, at least in
terms of what could be innovated. Under Vendor-Managed Inventory
(VMI), for example, the buyer delegates the making and implementation of inventory-replenishment decisions to the vendor. In order to do
so, the buyer's information system provides the vendor with information
about customer demand and inventory status. Levels 1 and 2 of Quick
Response (QR) are the same, with the addition of automatic orderprocessing (i.e., implementation) between retailer and supplier. Levels
3 and 4 of QR include cross-docking warehouses (i.e., faster implementation of warehousing decisions). Even Wal-Mart's RetailLink, although
awesome in its scale (e.g. 1 in the level of detail provided, with the type
and number of partners with access to it), is fundamentally: (1) a system for rapidly sharing transactions-level data and metrics about the
past and the present with its suppliers; and (2) a centralized system for
making and implementing decisions for its own facilities.
So, why the "significant improvements" from what I describe as ~~mod
est innovations"? There is an old saying that: "In the land of the blind,
the one-eyed man is king". Historically, supply-chain "partnerS 11 were
figuratively blind to one another. Add just a little vision - for example,
under QR, customer-demand and retailer-inventory information - and,
suddenly, there is no need for much of the buffering that had been required in the ~'land of the blind". Reducing inventory produces cash.
Reducing capacity increases productivity, and, hence, profitability. Reducing leadtimes attracts more customers.
Given the huge payoffs that supply-chain partners have derived from
sharing a modest amount of information or from delegating some decisionmaking and implementation from buyer to supplier, will more of the
same yield even larger payoffs? Where will it end? Will it end?
The "Axioms of the IDIB Portfolio" suggest that long before information-sharing and/or delegation of decision-making and implementation
becomes "totaP' between supply-chain partners - if it ever does - something even more revolutionary will happen.
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The axioms of the IDIB portfolio

The I'' Axiom of the IDIB Portfolio is this: Given
IDIB Portfolio, in~creasing the quality of one of its
facilitates decreasing the quality of one or more
three components while maintaining the same level
service {e.g., fill rate, leadtime).

an existing
components
of its other
of customer

In an inventory-replenishment system, for example, reducing the leadtime to implement a replenishment decision, facilitates decreasing the
safety-stock inventory or leadtime buffer - that is, decreasing its quality
- without affecting customer fill-rates, expected backorders, etc .. Or,
in the same setting, decreasing the variance of the leadtime to make a
replenishment decision by, say, one unit, facilitates increasing the corresponding implementation lead time variance by one unit. 4 Many such
tradeoffs are possible.
Schneider National Trucking Company's innovation of satellite tracking to locate its trucks allowed Schneider to reduce two of its costly
buffers while improving customer service. Here are some details:
Before introducing its satellite-based information system for locating
its thousands of trucks, Schneider dispatchers relied on periodic telephone calls from its drivers in order to learn where its trucks and drivers
were. The corresponding uncertainty about where and when its own
trucks would be available led to inflated promised pick-up times to customers and to a significant amount of idle capacity (i.e., "deadheading'',
which is a truck moving without a load). In other words, in the absence
of accurate information about the location of its own trucks, Schneider
buffered itself using leadtime and capacity. By adopting its satellitetracking system, Schneider was able to reduce both these buffers and
offer improved delivery performance.
The 1"' Axiom of the IDIB Portfolio might be called the "trade-off
axiom"; that is, by incurring increased cost for higher quality in one
component of the IDIB Portfolio it should be possible to reduce the
quality and cost of another component. If the cost reduction is larger
than the cost increase, then total portfolio cost has been reduced. Further,
as is often the case, some of the net savings can be invested in improving
competitiveness (e.g., increasing fill-rates, reducing delivery leadtimes,
offering higher levels of customization, reducing prices).
Other trade-offs are possible, too. For example: a make-to-stock manufacturer who has made the transition from a "push" management sys-

4 Assuming these processes are independent the same safety stock will provide the same
customer fill-rate, etc.
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tem (e.g., MRP) to a "pull" management system (e.g., JIT) has, everything else being equal: chosen to substitute buffer capacity for buffer
inventory (and: often, to shift the inventory-buffering responsibilities to
its suppliers and/or customers).
Sometimes, trade-offs are made to increase buffers. One example of
this, experienced by every supply-chain manager who has replaced a domestic supplier with a lower-cost international supplier, is the increase
in safety-stock inventory necessitated by the less-reliable transportation.
leadtimes from the off-shore supplier. In such cases, of course, the cost
saving in implementation (i.e., delivery of items ordered from the supplier) isn't typically in transportation- indeed, transportation cost may
increase - but in the cost of acquiring the materials themselves.
I believe that virtually all of the dramatic improvements reported by
companies in managing their own internal .supply chains or by companies and their partners in managing their shared supply chains can be
interpreted ~ indeed, could have been forecast - using the pt Axiom of
the IDIB Portfolio. That is, given the reduced cost of a "bettee' information system (as provided by innovations in information technology)
and the already high cost of buffering, that information could be substituted for buffers - that is, information improved in quality and buffering
reduced in quality5 ~ without reducing customer service and at reduced
total cost.
What the 1st Axiom doesn't suggest is the magnitude of improvement
in cash position, productivity, and competitiveness that so many partners have reported. This magnitude, of course, depends on the cost of
the buffering required by being "blind" and how much of a buffer reduction (i.e., reduced inventory, capacity, and/or leadtime) a little "vision"
provides.
So, will the future of supply-chain management involve even more
extensive information-sharing or delegation of decision-making and implementation between supply-chain partners? The 2nd Axiom suggests
some more, but, depending on the partnership, perhaps not a great deal
more.
The "2nd Axiom of the IDIB Portfolio" is this: Investment to im-

prove the quality of any single component of an IDIB Portfolio
will, over some range, decrease the total cost of the portfolio;
but, beyond some quality level, increase the total cost of the
portfolio.

5Recall that, everything else being equal, reducing the amount of buffering reduces its capability to compensate for imperfections. Hence, reducing the amount of buffering reduces its
"quality".
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Although "axioms1' are supposed to be self-evident, a little discussion
of the 2nd Axiom is appropriate. The 2nd Axiom considers what happens to total portfolio cost if one varies the quality level of any single
component of an IDIB Portfolio and adjusts the quality levels of the
other three components to- minimize the corresponding total portfolio
cost. For example, consider varying the quality of implementation in
some existing IDIB Portfolio. Applied to this example, the first half
of the proposition is that if implementation is very low in quality, for
example, that implementation lead time has a large mean and variance,
or that the accuracy of implementation is poor, then the total cost of
this IDIB Portfolio can be reduced by: (1) increasing the quality of
implementation; and (2) reducing the quality of the corresponding information and/or decision-making systems, and/or reducing the amount
of buffering {e.g., leadtime, capacity, or inventory)
The support for this proposition is that the cost of any of the four components of an IDIB Portfolio is an increasing and marginally-increasing
function of its quality. In this instance, the proposition is that the cost
of a low-quality implementation system is small, and that the cost to
improve its quality is low compared to the high cost of the information,
decision-making, and buffer systems required to work in combination
with it. :More specifically, given a low-quality implementation system,
management would probably have been forced a very high-cost buffer
system, possibly one with large inventories, or possibly one with large
leadtime and/or capacity buffers. Hence, improving the quality of implementation - which should cost relatively little - and reducing the
quality of its buffer system -which should save relatively more - will
reduce total portfolio cost.
The second half of the proposition is that continuing to improve the
quality of any single component and, correspondingly, decreasing the
quality of one or more of the other three components of an IDIB Portfolio will, beyond some point, increase total portfolio cost. The support
for this proposition, again, is that the cost of any of the four components of an IDIB Portfolio is an increasing and marginally-increasing
function of its quality. In terms of the example, the proposition is that
if the implementation system is already operating at a very high level of
quality - e.g., nearly immediate, nearly perfect implementation - then
the cost of any incremental improvement will be large relative to the
savings generated by the corresponding decreases in the quality levels
of buffering, information, or decision-making that this improvement in
implementation facilitates.
The 2nd Axiom might be called the "golden mean" axiom; that is, it
doesn't make sense to invest too much in improving a single component
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of the IDIB Portfolio without making corresponding improvements in its
other components.

7.

The future of supply-chain management

Given that the current state-of-the-art in supply-chain management
involves some, perhaps even a great deal 1 of information sharing and
some delegation of decision-making and implementation, the axioms suggest that even if the net savings from more information-sharing and
delegation is positive, some other change in the IDIB Portfolio may
yield larger net savings. In other words 1 the question is not whether
more information-sharing or more delegated decision-making or more
delegated implementation will reduce total portfolio cost. Instead 1 the
question is: Which changes in which components of the supply chain's
IDIB Portfolio will facilitate the largest reduction in total portfolio cost?
I believe that the most likely candidates for large net cost savings
is in collaborative decision-making and/or collaborative implementation.
What's "collaborative''?
Broadly speaking "collaborative'' and "shared'' mean the same thing,
but I use the word "collaborative11 in order to make an important distinction between visibility and participation. 1'Shared information'' is about
visibility: that is, within some given domain, all the partners "see'' the
same thing. Hence, "shared'' decision-making or ''shared" implementation might be interpreted to mean decision-making or implementation
that is visible to all the partners. Although such visibility is important, participating in decision-making or participating in implementation means something much more significant. Participation means that
both partners' objective functiOns, constraints 1 and relative capabilities
are considered. From an operations-research perspective, collaborative
decision-making and implementation involve joint optimization 1 not independent optimization.
The 2nd Axiom suggests that if partners are doing little or no collaborative decision-making or implementation: then it is possible that the
greatest potential for improvement is in precisely these areas. Moreover,
the higher quality of the components of the supply chain's IDIB portfolio
is in other respects, the more likely shared decision-making and imple6
mentation are to provide the most significant total cost reductions.

addition, independent decision-making based on the same information, or delegated
decision-making and implementation, at best, yield locally-optimal decisions and actions.

6 1n
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The IDIB portfolio, The Goal, and the Theory of Constraints
In his ground-breaking book, The Goal (Goldratt and Cox, 1985), Eli
Goldratt introduced the concept of bottlenecks in a firm's production
capacity that limit its "throughpuf'; i.e., the rate at which a production
system generates money through sales. From the perspective of the
JDIB paradigm, throughput is a dollar-oriented quality characteristic
of a firm's implementation (i.e., production) system. Correspondingly,
Goldratt 's bottleneck concept is that this quality characteristic - the
capability of the implementation system to generate dollars through sales
- is limited by the bottleneck process( es) internal to the implementation
system.
Of course, a firm's implementation system doesn't generate throughput all by itself. Decisions must be made about what to produce, when
to produce it, etc. This is the role of the decision-making system. And,
in order to make decisions, the decision-making system requires information that's provided by the information system. Finally, buffer systems
are there to provide throughput by compensating for whatever imperfections might exist in the IDL systems. In other words, it is a firm's
entire JDIB portfolio that generates money through sales, not just its
implementation system.
Although Goldratt doesn't recognize the IDIB Portfolio explicitly, his
prescriptions most certainly apply to it. For example, Goldratt prescribes that decision-making in the management system should be focused on the "drum'' of the implementation-system's bottleneck(s) and
the "ropes" that feed it. Goldratt also has prescriptions about the
form, location, and amount of buffering that should be provided 7 , and
about the nature of the information systemss management should use
in decision-making. In brief, Goldratt recommends that all four components of a firm's IDIB portfolio should be focused on the supply (and
demand) bottlenecks. Hence, the IDIB paradigm and the bottleneck
paradigm are consistent, indeed, complementary, to one another.
Specifically, I believe that the IDIB paradigm enriches the paradigm
of The Goal in several ways. For example, the IDIB paradigm suggests
that the "goal" of making money can be achieved by virtually unlimited
number of different IDIB portfolios, each component contributing in its
characteristic way (i.e., gathering information, making decisions, etc.),
each imperfect in different ways, and each compensating for imperfec-

7 For example,
buffer inventory in front of bottlenecks and buffer leadtimes to protect delivery
dates.
ssee Goldratt, 1991.
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tions in the others. Second, of course, that the quality of each of these
components is a decision variable.
Next, recall that Goldratt points out that the only guaranteed way
for a firm to. make money is to simultaneously increase throughput and
reduce "'inventori' and "operating expenses" .9 However, Goldratt offers
relatively little guidance about how to reduce inventory and operating
expense, much less minimize them. The IDIB paradigm suggests how:
select the least total cost IDIB portfolio. In other words, since most of a
.firm's operating expenses are driven by management's chosen IDL systems and most of its inventory is in itS safety-stock and capacity buffers,
by carefully choosing its IDIB portfolio management will minimize its
combined operating expenses and inventory
Finally, note that the "bottleneck'' concept is imbedded in the 2nd
Axiom. Here's how: Consider a company with medium-to-high quality
decision-making and implementation systems, but a low-quality information system. Under these circumstances, the overall quality of this
company 1s IDL systems is limited by its low-quality information-system.
According to the znd Axiom, if this company invests in a better information system, the overall quality of its IDL systems will improve. This
improvement facilitates the reduction in its associated buffers. Given
some (low) range of information-system quality, the effect should be to
reduce the total cost of this company's IDIB portfolio.
Next, consider a company with an excellent implementation system,
say a state-of-the-art cellular system, but with mediocre-quality information and decision-making systems. Additional improvement in this
company's implementation system will yield an improvement in its overall IDL systems, and facilitate a reduction of the corresponding buffers.
However, the money saved on the buffer system may be less than the
additional cost of the improved implementation system. The result is
an increase in total portfolio cost.
From Goldratt 's viewpoint, the ''bottleneck'' in the quality of first
company's IDL systems is its information system: a dollar invested there
yielded more than a dollar saved on the buffer system, thereby reducing
the firm's total inventory and operating expenses. On_ the other hand,
the "bottlenecle' in the quality of second company's IDL systems wasn't
its implementation system. Hence, a dollar invested there is a dollar
wasted. 10
9 According

to Goldratt, "inventory" is the dollars that a firm has invested in -things that
it intends to sell, while operating expense is the cost of things that fir finn does to turn
inventory into throughput.
10 0f course, neither of these improvements, whether they would reduce its total IDIB portfolio cost or not, necessarily increases the company's throughput. Throughput would only be
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The future is wow for some supply-chain partners
Some supply-chain partners are already sharing decision-making. Since
1995, Heineken USA, Inc. and its independent distributors have been
sharing information and decision-niaking about the replenishment of
Heineken's beer products under a system called HOPS: the Heinekcn Operational Planning System (http: I /64.158.250 .111/news/heineken.
html and http: I /64.158.250 .111/news/archi ve99/06091999 .html).
Intel and its customer computer-assemblers (e.g., IBM, Dell, Compaq)
have been using a collaborative information- sharing and decision-making
system to manage the assembler's inventories of computer chips under
Intel's Supply-Line Management (SLM) program.
One well-known and widely-implemented system for information-sharing and collaborative decision-making in supply chains is Collaborative
Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR).

8.

Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and
Replenishment (CPFR)

CPFR is a process model, shared by a buyer and supplier, through
which inventory-status, forecast-, and promotion-oriented information
are shared and replenishment decisions are made. In IDIB Portfolio
terms, a process model for sharing information and decision-making between a buyer and supplier.
CPFR began with a pilot program between Wal-Mart and WarnerLambert, called CFAR: "Collaborative Forecasting and Replenishment".
In 1997, the Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Standards (VICS) Association (http: I /vies. or g) developed the "CPFR Initiative" (http: I I
www. cpfr. org). In 1998, VICS published the first "CPFR Guidelines"
(http: I;.,.,. cpfr. org/Guidelines .html). Since then, a large number of partners have developed CPFR pilots. Appendix 1 provides a
partial list. Several partnerships have subsequently adopted CPFR as a
standard way of doing business with one another.
The CPFR process
CPFR consists of 9 process steps, as follows:
Step 1. Develop Front-End Agreement: Roles, Measurement, Readiness

increased if the changes to the entire IDIB portfolio increase avaHability or other.vise make
the company's products more competitive. Nonetheless, even if throughput isn't increased,
reducing the total IDIB portfolio cost reduces a company's operating expense, which increases
profits; i.e., makes more money.
.
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Step 2. Create Joint Business Plan: Strategies and Tactics
Step 3. Create Sales Forecasts; Buyer and supplier both create customer-demand forecasts

Step 4. Identify Exceptions in Sales Forecasts
Step 5. Resolve Exceptions: Agree on single forecast or agree to disagree

Step 6. Create Order Forecasts: Buyer and supplier both create plans
for buyer orders
Step 7. Identify Exceptions in Order Forecasts
Step 8. Resolve Exceptions: Agree on single plan for buyer orders

Step 9. Order Generation
More details about these steps and the roles of the buyer and supplier
in each step are provided in Figure 1.1 and at the VICS CPFR website
(http: I /www. cpfr. or g). However, the basics of CPFR are straightforward: First, the partners share information about demand. If the buyer
is a retailer - and so far, most buyers using CPFR are retailers, then
demand is retail customer demand. If the buyer is a manufacturer or
assembler then demand is generated by the manufacturer or assembler's
trial master-production schedule. Then, significant differences between
the buyer's and seller's demand forecast, labeled "exceptions, are discussed and resolved. These are Steps 3-5 above. Then, buyer and supplier share plans for orders that the buyer will place with the supplier,
based on the shared demand forecasts. Again, exceptions are identified
and resolved (Steps 6-8). Subsequently, using the shared order plan,
actual orders are generated (Step 9). The foundation for Steps 3-9 is
the so-called "front-end agreement", under which the roles of the buyer
and supplier and their capabilities to perform these roles are assessed.
In this step, targeted performance and measures are also adopted. In
Step 2, specific strategies and tactics are specified in detail.
The benefits reported by CPFR partners, as might be predicted by
the axioms, are increased inventory turns (i.e.: lower buffer inventory)
and increased fill-rates for the SKU's involved; that is, higher levels of
customer service.
Several consulting firms offer software systems and support for CPFR,
among them Logility, Inc. (http://www .logility. com) and Syncra Systems, Inc. (http://www.syncrasystems.com). CPFR is also being implemented on B2B exchanges such as Worldwide Retail Net, Transora,
and NetXchange.
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Based on the success of CPFR between single buyer-supplier pairs,
thought leaders in CPFR have suggested its extension to include collaboration with the carrier that transports goods between the buyer and
supplier. This is called "CTM'': Collaborative Transportation Management. (http: I I""". cpfr. orgiWhi tePapersiCTMwhi tepaper. pdf). It
has also been suggested that in order to be truly successful, collaboration should involve all of the links of a supply chain, under a scheme
labeled "n-Tier Collaboration" (http: I lw"". cpfr. orgiWhi tePapersl
nTierProposal. doc). Under such a scheme, for example, not only
would Kimberly-Clark collaborate with Wal-Mart to plan Wal-Mart's
orders of Kimberly-Clark products, but Kimberly-Clark would, in turn,
collaborate with its suppliers to determine Kimberly-Clark's orders for
materials for its paper products. So, in effect, Wal-Mart and KimberlyClark's suppliers would be collaborating with Kimberly-Clark to determine plans to supply and order Kimberly-Clark's paper products.
The challenges of CPFR
Although CPFR has enormous potential for reducing the total cost of
any supply chain's IDIB portfolio, there are also enormous challenges.
At the most fundamental level, buyers and suppliers must develop trust
that each will treat the other fairly and honestly. Prerequisite for this are
incentives to do so. Again, see Cachon, 2004 for a review of the supplychain literature on the management of incentive conflicts with contracts.
On a technical level, buyers and suppliers must develop a common language for identifying products and making decisions about them. (See
http:llwww.cpfr.orgiWhitePapersiCollaborationDataM odelingA.
pdf). Similarly, systems must be developed for linking the buyer's and
supplier's business processes. This will involve a great deal of system
change and training. Third, security protocols must be implemented
that will safeguard both partners from leaks of proprietary information.
Nonetheless, I believe that buyers and suppliers who find ways to
overcome these challenges will achieve a competitive advantage, particularly for products that complete primarily on price and availability
(e.g., consumer products). This advantage will either force the competitors of CPFR partners to adopt similar techniques or force them out of
business.

9.

Research topics in CPFR

CPFR poses many interesting questions for supply-chain researchers,
questions whose answers involve models that have yet to be developed.
At the broadest level, there are questions involving the "drivers" for
collaboration. For example, what are characteristics of buyers, suppliers,
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and the environments in which they operate that promotes a desire on
either of their parts to collaborate using CPFR? It is well known that
agency losses occur in decentralized supply chains that involve hidden
information and/ or hidden actions. What is less well known are the
circumstances under which both the buyer and supplier will be better
off by collaborating. See, for example, Monahan, 1984; Weng, 1995 and
Taylor, 2001. In the absence of these circumstances ·or other incentives
for collaboration, collaboration, in general 1 and CPFR, in particular,
seem doomed.
With respect to CPFR in particular, consider a buyer-supplier pair.
Among the most interesting research questions are: First, how should the
"front-endn agreement be structured in order to maximize - or merely1
increase - the profits for both partners? What role will each partner
play? How should performance improvement be measured? Perhaps
most important, how should the benefits of improved performance be
shared between the buyer and the supplier so that both will be better
off?
Another set of interesting questions involves defining the elements of
the data to be shared. For example, given the cost of data processing and
security considerations, should SKU-level data be shared or should only
aggregate information be shared? What aggregation/disaggregation procedures are best?
Finally, given that there are costs and benefits associated with exception-processing, regardless of how they are processed, how should exceptions be defined? More fundamentally, what does it mean to process an
exception; that is, given a significant difference between and the buyer's
and seller's forecast (planned orders), how should the difference be resolved?

10.

Research topics related to supply-chain
collaboration

Another set of interesting research questions involves the examination of supply-chain collaboration in general, whether or not the tools
used are those of CPFR. For example, given a supply chain with some
given level of collaboration in information-sharing, decision-making, implementation, and buffering - including no collaboration whatsoever then, assuming that collaboration will be increased, which links should
be involved, and in which components of the IDIB will collaboration
yield the largest payoffs to the involved partners and to the entire supply chain? Further, how will be benefits of collaboration be measured
and shared between partners and along the chain?
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An equally interesting set of questions involve collaboration itself. For
example, consider a supply chain with some given level of collaboration
in information-sharing, decision-making, implementation, and buffering
- including no collaboration whatsoever. Then, given the costs and
challenges of collaboration, is collaboration the most cost-effective way to
improve supply-chain performance? In particular, improving the quality
of one or more of the components of one of the partner's IDIB pOrtfolios
may yield larger improvements at lower cost. If so, then, again, how will
benefits be measured and shared?

11.

Research on the IDIB portfolio

In generalizing the OR paradigm, the IDIB Portfolio paradigm provides rich and challenging opportunities for operations researchers.
I believe that the OR paradigm has focused almost entirely on model·
ing only a single component of supply-chain IDIB portfolios, typically on
the decision-making component. To the extent that the associated information and implementation systems are represented, these models treat
them as fixed, as costs, or as constraints, but not as decision-variables.
For example, such models typically take the quality of the information
system as given (e.g., demand is known or given by some particular
probability distribution with fixed parameters) and implementation systems are represented as parameterized lead times or by their cost drivers
(e.g., the parameterized cost of performing a set up or the unit cost of
holding inventory). The form of buffering {i.e., inventory, lead time, or
capacity) is usually also fixed. In general, the objective function is to
select the decision (or decision-rule) that minimizes the associated implementation costs plus the too-much and not-enough costs associated
with the buffer system. Other models, in particular, those that treat
either the information system or the implementation system as a decision variable, typically ignore the other three components of the IDIB
as decision variables.
That's the "bad news".
The "good news" is that the OR paradigm's focus has facilitated the
development of fairly sophisticated decision rules and provided limited
insight into information and implementation systems. It is also "good
news" that many of the techniques employed in the OR paradigm, for
example, well-proven estimation and optimization techniques, can be
applied improving, if not optimizing, the IDIB Portfolio model of a
management system. For example, cost-estimating techniques that are
already being applied to estimating the cost of a given implementation
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system can be applied to determining the cost of alternative information,
implementation, and buffer systems.
Notwithstanding the availability of OR tools, the challenges of IDIB
Portfolio optimization, even if done heuristically, are daunting. Recall,
the "optimal IDIB Portfolio" is the portfolio of information, decisionmaking, implementation, and buffering whose combined cost plus the
cost of failing to provide enough of whatever was demanded or required
(e.g., backordering or expediting cost) is the minimum possible cost.
Hence, IDIB Portfolio optimization involves four decision-variables not
simply one. Further, in order to be useful in selecting an IDIB portfolio,
IDIB models must be able to capture complex cost-quality interactions
among these components, not just the cost-quality characteristic of each
component.
Practice-oriented research also presents interesting research opportunities. For example, consider a firm's current IDIB portfolio and assume
management has the desire to "improven it. The question is: Where
(i.e., which component is the "bottleneck" of the current IDL systems
and what improvement should be made to it? Before this question can
be answered, operations researcher must first develop techniques and
measures to assess the capabilities of each of its components. Next, in
order to make the most cost-effective improvement, managers will require a priori estimates of the marginal costs and benefits of the next
increment in quality in their current components. Further, there are
questions relating to the timing of !DIE portfolio changes. For example,
although adopting current technology might reduce total portfolio cost,
should management forego adopting it, and, instead, wait for new technology that might provide even larger total cost reductions? Technology
forecasting must play a role in answering this question.
Despite the daunting nature of the challenges to improving a firm's
current IDIB portfolio or optimizing a proposed IDIB portfolio, operations researchers will be foregoing a tremendous opportunity if they
continue to focus on optimizing one component of the IDIB portfolio at
a time. Worse, they commit the Cardinal Sin of Operations Research:
Sub-Optimization.

12.

Some related literature

Most of the literature in supply-chain management can be viewed from
the perspective of the IDIB portfolio. As explained above, I believe that
most of this literature examines the choice of the decision (e.g., order
quantity, target inventory) or decision-rule (e.g., BOQ) to minimize total
buffer quantity. See the discussion of the newsvendor model above, for
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example. Some of this literature also examines the impact of implementation issues on the decision-making. For example, in a highly-stylized
way the EOQ formula represents the impact of set-up (i.e., implementation) cost on the optimal order quantity. However, there are some signs
of interesting developments.
A growing body of literature examines the value of information-sharing
in managing a supply chain. Lee et al., 2000: for example, have shown
that information-sharing can dampen the so-called "bullwhip effect" so
often observed in supply chains. Chen et al., 2000 have shown that the
bullwhip effect can be reduced by centralizing information. Cachon and
Fisher, 2000 study the value of sharing demand and inventory-level information in a supply chain. Aviv, 2001 examines the effect of collaborative
forecasting on supply-chain performance.
A small, but growing body of research involves collaborative replenishment decision-making to take advantage of shared information. For
example, Song and Zipkin, 1996 develop an inventory-replenishm ent policy to take advantage of information about supply conditions. Aviv,
2002 examines joint forecasting and replenishment processes. Iyer and
Ye, 2000 develop a model to assess the value of information-sharing in
a retail environment in which retailers share promotional information
with their suppliers.
However, I am not aware of any research that addresses itself to "managing the IDIB Portfolid'; that is, making decisions about the nature
and quality of all its four components: the information, decision-making,
implementation, and buffer systems.
Nonetheless, there are two papers of particular relevance to "managing
the IDIB Portfolio that I would like to draw attention to:
Milgrom and Roberts, 1988 develop a model of a manufacturer and
the market for its products, and, for this particular model, establish
that the optimal management system will either produce to inventory
or produce to customer order. In IDIB Portfolio terms, Milgrom and
Roberts examine a model in which there is a cost to acquire information
about market demand and a cost to produce. Their analysis concludes
that a profit-maximizing firm will either: (1) acquire no additional information about customer demand and produce entirely to inventory; or
{2) acquire complete information about customer demand and produce
entirely to customer order.
It should be noted that Milgrom and Robert's result is specific to the
assumptions of the model they propose. Other assumptions would yield
different results. For example, Milgrom and Robert's model ignores the
production (implementation) leadtime, customer preferences, and competition. Given significant production leadtimes and customer prefer-
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ence for availability over variety, a manufacturer that might otherwise
choose make-to-order might be forced to make to stock. Alternatively,
given customer preference for variety over availability, a manufacturer
that might otherwise choose make-to-stock might be forced to make to
order. Nonetheless, Milgram and Roberts are the first to suggest tradeoff's between information and inventory {i.e., one form of buffer).
Hariharan and Zipkin, 1995 implicitly suggest tradeoffs between the
characteristics of a company's information system and implementation
system. In particular, within a supply-chain setting, they establish the
equivalence between the information system's ability to "see'' one more
(Jess) period of demand into the future and the ability of the implementation system to produce one period faster {slower).
The use of the "ICE Portfolio" paradigm, which is closely related to
the IDIB paradigm, in teaching operations management can be found in
Schwarz, 1998.

13.

Summary

In this chapter, I have introduced a new paradigm for management in
general and for managing supply chains, in particular, called the IDIB
Portfolio. The !DIE Portfolio, which can be viewed as a generalization of
the OR paradigm, takes the view, that the quality of all four components
of a management system- not just the buffer system quality (i.e., size)
- are decision variables; and that the underlying quality-cost function
for each of these components - that is~ the cost to move them in the
direction of perfection - is increasing and marginally increasing. Finally,
that there is a cost associated with the entire !DIE portfolio - again,
not just the buffer system - for failing to provide whatever is required
or demanded. Hence, the "optimal" !DIE is the !DIE that minimizes
the total costs of all of its components plus the cost of failing to provide
whatever is required or demanded.
The !DIE Portfolio and its axioms provide insight into the evolution
of supply-chain practice to date, and, I believe, suggest that the future of
supply-chain management practice will involve a significant level of collaborative decision-making and implementation: a level of collaboration
in decision-making and implementation that is comparable to the level of
information-sharing in contemporary supply-chain management. I have
described the VICS CPFR initiative as one example of this future. Finally, I have suggested several research topics involving CPFR and, more
broadly, challenging new research into the IDIB Portfolio paradigm.
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Appendix: List of Buyers and Suppliers participating
in CPFR partnerships
Source: The VICS CPFR® Matrix, January 2002. This list is maintained monthly
by Moon Watch Media, Inc. See http: I /wwY .retailsystems. com/communi tycenters
/cccc/cpfrmatrix.pdf.

Table J.A.J.

Buyers
10 Internal Affiliates
4 Retailers
850 n- Tier Partners
Ace Hardware
Albertson's
Best Buy
Canadian Tire

McDonald's France
Meijer

Mervyn's
Radio Shack
RiteAid
Royal Ahold

RONA

cvs

Safeway

Dansk

Safeway (UK)

Dealers

Sainsbury

Delhaize le Lion
Distributors
Do It Best
Eckerd
Federated Department Stores
H.E. Butt
Home Depot
J.C. Penney
Jusco
Landis.

SAKS

Marshall Field's
Match Supermarket
McDonald's

Sears Roebuck
Somerfield
Sports Authority
Staples
Superdrug
Target
Tesco
TruValue
Walgreens
Wal-Mart
Wickes Furniture
Woolworth UK
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Suppliers

12 Suppliers
20+ Suppliers
Ashley Furniture
Ball Sports
Black & Decker
Broyhill
Chane}
Chapin
Colgate-Palmolive
Compaq
Eastman Chemicals
ECPG3
Eli Lily
Feather Fruit Growers' Cooperative
FujiFilm
G E Appliances
General Mills
Genovs
Georgia Pacific
Harley- Davidson
Hasbro
Heineken
Henkel
Herlitz
Hewlett-Packard
HYKo
Inland Paperboard & Packaging
International Paper
John Deere
Johnson & Johnson
Kao
Kimberly Clark
Kraft
Lever-fabrege

Levi
Levi Strauss
Liquid Nails
Liz Claiborne
Manco
Maro
Master Lock
Meriat
Mitsubishi Motors
Nelson
Nestle UK
New Balance
Pacific Coast
Panasonic
Philips Consumer
Pillowtex
PlumbPak
Polo Ralph Lauren
Proctor & Gamble
Reynolds Metals
Rowe Companies
Sara Lee
Schering-Plough
Solo Cup
Spectrum
Thomson Electronics
Timberland
Truya
Unilever Argentina
Vandemoortele of Belgium
Warner-Lambert
Whitehall Robbins
Woodstream
YKK
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